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COMMENTS
THE FUTURE OF STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE
WATER EXPORT AFTER Sporhase v. Nebraska
Bill Bronson
I. INTRODUCTION
The land's curse is its endless, relentless aridity. Lack of
water has molded the western past like no single factor. Like a
malevolent vise, aridity has constricted, controlled, and chan-
neled, shaping settlement patterns, dictating economic systems,
influencing the style and substance of life itself. Whatever the
West became, whatever it is now, it is no more than aridity has
allowed.. . . Aridity is the central force in western life. It has
been from the beginning, it is today, and it will be tomorrow.'
Westerners weary of the century old struggle with the forces of nature
have been subjected in recent years to an equally frustrating battle with the
federal government and the courts over the allocation and development of
scarce water resources in the region. This confrontation has been
intensified by the United States Supreme Court's decision last year in
Sporhase v. Nebraska.8 Sporhase is the first ruling in many decades to
address an important question for western states: to what extent may a
state regulate-even ban-the transfer of water beyond its political
boundaries? Although this case has already figured in some recent political
and judicial discourse over the future of water use and development, its
ultimate impact may not be certain without future litigation.
This Comment will explore the impact of Sporhase on various state
laws affecting the interstate transfer of water. Ideally, the observations and
arguments advanced herein should prove useful to state legislatures
interested in drafting constitutionally permissible regulations, as well as
1. R. LAMM & M. MCCARTHY, THE ANGRY WEST: A VULNERABLE LAND AND ITs FUTURE 162
(1982).
2. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645 (1978); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Office of the Solicitor in the United
States Department of Interior provoked a not-so-minor controversy in 1979 by issuing a legal opinion
concluding that the federal government had the right to make use of unappropriated water on federal
lands without regard to state water adjudication laws. See 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979). This much-
criticized opinion has been repudiated by the new administration. Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914
(Supp. I), U.S. Dept. of Interior (Sept. 11, 1981). See also Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights,
Off. of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice (June 17, 1982) (repudiation of so-called federal "non-
reserved" water rights discussed in 1979 Solicitor's Opinion).
3. 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
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parties inclined toward further litigation of the export issue.
II. THE DECISION
Joy Sporhase and several other parties jointly owned adjacent tracts
of land in Chase County, Nebraska, and Phillips County, Colorado.4 A
well located on the Nebraska side pumped groundwater for irrigation of
both tracts.5 Although the well had been registered by the landowners'
predecessors in title, as required by law," neither they nor the parties to the
immediate case had applied for an additional permit required by another
Nebraska law.7 Under the terms of this statute, an individual could not
transport groundwater outside the state of Nebraska without an initial
determination by the State Director of Water Resources that the with-
drawal was reasonable, not contrary to conservation, and not detrimental
to the public welfare.8 In addition, the issuance of a permit hinged upon a
finding that the state in which the water was to be used granted reciprocal
rights to withdraw groundwater from that state for use in Nebraska.'
The state brought suit to enjoin Sporhase and the other proprietors
from irrigating the Colorado tracts without the permit. An injunction was
granted by the trial court despite the landowners' contentions that
groundwater was an article of commerce and that the statute amounted to
an unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.'
0
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed." The court
rejected the landowners' argument that water was freely transferable and
therefore an article of commerce, citing in support the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.12
In Hudson County, the Supreme Court held that the State of New Jersey
could, in the exercise of its police powers, forbid or condition the export of
water beyond its political boundaries.' The Nebraska court was uncon-
vinced by the landowners' argument that other United States Supreme
Court precedents limiting the rights of states to condition transfers of other
4. Id. at 3458.
5. Id.
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-602 (1978). See Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3458.
7. Id. at 3458.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
9. Id.
10. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3458. See also State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703,705,
305 N.W.2d 614, 616 (1981).
11. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
12. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 709,305 N.W.2d at
618.
13. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 355-57.
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natural resources like natural gas14 and minnows15 were controlling in this
case. The court noted that:
The natural resources dealt with in those cases have historically
been market items, reducible to private possession and freely
exchangeable for value. This has never been the case with
groundwater in Nebraska. Further, since water is the only
natural resource absolutely essential to human survival, the
application of rules designed to facilitate commerce in less
essential resources to the transfer of water must be done, if at all,
with extreme caution.. 6
Caution in this instance convinced the majority of the court to distinguish
between water and other natural resources and uphold the constitutional-
ity of the Nebraska statute.17
Undeterred by these conclusions, the landowners appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the
Nebraska high court.' The case presented the Court with an opportunity
to resolve several questions in the field of water law left unsettled since the
1960's. The Court's reasoning, however, raises new questions for states
regulating the export of water.
At the outset, the Court determined that the answers to three
questions would control the outcome of the appeal: (1) was groundwater an
article of commerce, subject to congressional legislation; (2) did the
Nebraska statute so restrict the flow of water as to impose an impermissible
burden on commerce; and (3) did Congress grant Nebraska and other
states permission to enact groundwater regulations that would have been
otherwise forbidden under the negative implications of the commerce
clause?19
14. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (state law designed to retain all natural
gas discovered in that state for local needs held to be unconstitutional burden on commerce); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Nat. Gas. Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (state law prohibiting interstate transportation of
natural gas held unconstitutional).
15. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (state law prohibiting transfer outside of state for
sale minnows obtained from waters of same state held repugnant to the commerce clause).
16. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 709-10, 305 N.W.2d at 619.
17. Id. at 710,305 N.W.2d at 619. Chief Justice Norman Krivosha dissented from that portion
of the court's opinion upholding the reciprocity clause. He argued that the provision created an
unreasonable classification between in-state and out-of-state uses of water. Under the terms of the
statute, the State Director of Water Resources could find that a proposed out-of-state use would be
perfectly reasonable and beneficial, and yet be prohibitied from approving the transfer because the
transferee state did not grant reciprocal rights. Such an outcome was irrational and therefore
unconstitutional under the due process provisions of the United States Constitution and the Nebraska
Constitution. Id. at 712-14, 305 N.W.2d at 620-21.
18. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3465-67 (1982).
19. Id. at 3457-58. The appellants renewed due process and equal protection arguments first
raised during the state appeal, but the Court did not reach these in light of its handling of the commerce
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To answer the first question, the Court had to dust off the pages of its
seventy-four year old decision in Hudson County-the touchstone of the
Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion-and reassess its meaning. Hudson
County dealt with efforts by a New York-based water company to obtain
access to New Jersey water. The company argued that the state's
prohibition on interstate export of water impaired the obligations of
contract, took property without just compensation, interfered with inter-
state commerce, denied privileges afforded New Jersey residents, and
denied New York citizens equal protection of the laws.20 Much of the
Supreme Court's decision revolved around the just compensation claim,
which was dismissed as nebulous in light of the state's interest in preserving
waters within its political boundaries-a valid exercise of the police
power.21 The commerce clause challenge was dismissed by Justice Holmes,
the author of Hudson County, with the conclusion that "[a] man cannot
acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in commerce among the
states. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited and qualified right to
the same end." 22
That conclusion was premised on a late nineteenth century Supreme
Court decision, Geer v. Connecticut."3 In Geer, the Court upheld a state
ban on the interstate transportation of game birds captured in the state, on
the ancient theory that the state "owned" wild animals within its borders
and could legally qualify the rights to those animals by private individuals
who had "captured" them.24 One such qualification was the prohibition
against interstate transfer of the captured animals.25 The Court in Hudson
County simply extended the legal fiction of state ownership of wild game to
water, a resource not easily amenable to the precepts of real property law.
Thus, New Jersey could so much as forbid the removal of "its" resource
from within its boundaries; it could, in effect, remove water from the list of
commercial articles, just as an individual could withhold his property from
the marketplace.
In Sporhase, the Court recognized Nebraska's reliance on Hudson
County as the way to keep groundwater regulation from the purview of
commerce clause analysis. 28 Nevertheless, the Court was obliged to
contrast the holding in Hudson County with the later and more contrary
clause issue. Id. at 2458 n. 3.
20. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 353-54.
21. Id. at 356-57.
22. Id. at 357.
23. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
24. Id. at 522-35.
25. Id. at 535.
26. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3459.
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opinion in City ofAltus v. Carr,27 the case relied upon heavily by Sporhase
and other appellants. 28 City ofAltus was concerned with an attempt by the
Texas legislature in the 1960's to forbid the interstate transfer of
groundwater without legislative approval.29 Prior to enactment of the
statute, the City of Altus, Oklahoma, had contracted with a Texas
landowner to have groundwater pumped from below his land and piped to
the city.30 The city sought an injunction from a three-judge federal district
court prohibiting enforcement of the statute.3" The State of Texas
defended its conditional ban on interstate water transfers by asserting that
it was designed to conserve and protect the supply of groundwater, and that
even if the result was burdensome, groundwater was not an article of
commerce subject to constitutional protection.32
Relying upon the reasoning in the same "natural gas" cases distin-
guished by the Nebraska Supreme Court, the federal court in Texas
rejected that state's argument, noting that even the principle of conserva-
tion could not justify a discriminatory ban on interstate export of certain
resources.3 3 Furthermore, groundwater in Texas was subject to a "rule of
capture," i.e., any person who drilled for and made use of that resource was
considered the "owner." As such, groundwater was treated as a form of
private property, freely transferable or saleable by its owner, and was not
considered the property of the sovereign. 4 In this context, water could be
considered an "article of commerce" and be subject to judicial
protection.35
City of Altus was affirmed without opinion by the United States
Supreme Court in 1966.36 This summary judgment puzzled commenta-
tors, who speculated that City of Altus may have overruled Hudson
27. 255 F.Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), a.ffd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
28. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3459.
29. 255 F.Supp. at 830, 832. The law provided that:
No one shall withdraw water from any underground source in this State for use in any other
state by drilling a well in Texas and transporting the water outside the boundaries of the
State unless the same be specifically authorized by an Act of the Texas Legislature and
thereafter as approved by it.
Act of Aug. 30, 1965, ch. 568, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1245, repealed by Act of Apr. 12, 1971, ch. 58,
1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 658.
30. 255 F. Supp. at 831-32.
31. Id. at 830.
32. Id. at 838-39.
33. Id. at 838-39. The conservation rationale was deemed weak in this particular instance, since
"intrastate production and transportation of water between points within the State" could be
maintained without legislative interference. Id. at 840 (emphasis added).
34. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 840, citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasonton, 154
Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146,81 S.W. 279 (1904).
35. City of Altus, 355 F. Supp. at 840.
36. 385 U.S. 35 (1966), aff'g 255 V. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
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County, albeit sub silentio3 7 When called upon to interpret the meaning of
the former opinion, the Supreme Court in Sporhase emphasized that its
summary affirmance "did not necessarily adopt the [federal district]
court's reasoning."3 8 Indeed, the Court opined that the Nebraska court
decision before it was "not necessarily inconsistent"3 9 with the reasoning in
the federal case. The Nebraska court had itself distinguished City ofAltus
on the belief that groundwater is not freely appropriable in Nebraska as in
Texas, but is instead, under the Nebraska constitution, a "public neces-
sity," 40 subject to state regulations on the nature and quantity of use.41 As
such, the Supreme Court agreed that a Nebraska surface owner lacked a
"comparable interest" 42 in the water beneath his land.
Nevertheless, this distinction did not convince the Court to end its
analysis in favor of the state's position, for as the Court noted, City ofAltus
was inconsistent with Hudson County.43 The fatal wound of irreconcilabil-
ity lay in Hudson County's reliance on the public ownership theory
expressed in Geer v. Connecticut. The district court in City of Altus had
rejected this theory on the grounds that a legal fiction should not be allowed
to defeat the substance of the commerce clause. 4 More importantly, Geer
had been overruled by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma5 in
1979. In laying Geer to rest, the Court had concluded that a mere legal
fiction did nothing more than symbolize the power of a state to preserve and
protect vital natural resources, and that this simple fact should not be a
barrier to judicial scrutiny of regulations banning or otherwise condition-
ing the interstate transfer of those resources.46 By concluding that water
should now be considered an article of commerce, the Court was fulfilling
the prophecies of the commentators. 47
37. See, e.g., Clark, The Colorado Doctrine: Surface-Water Rights by Appropriation Only, in 5
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 114 (R.E. Clark ed. 1967); Corker, Water Rights in Interstate Streams,
in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 319, 321 (R.E. Clark ed. 1967); Note, Water Rights and the
Commerce Clause: City of Altus v. Carr, 47 OR.L.REV. 228 (1968).
38. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3461. Affirmance indicates only the Court's agreement with thejudgment of the lower federal court. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 499(1981).
39. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3461.
40. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
41. See, e.g., Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 799-801, 140
N.W.2d 626, 636-37 (1966).
42. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3461.
43. Id.
44. 255 F. Supp. at 840.
45. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). See supra note 15.
46. Id. at 329-35.
47. See, e.g., Ladd, Federal and Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water Law: Support for a
State Water Plan, 42 MoNT.L.REV. 267, 310 (1981). Cf. Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal
Development, 51 U.COLO.L.REv. 511,559 (1980) (Hughes probably "implicitly overrules" Hudson
County); Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause, and State Control of
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The state of Nebraska attempted to draw a distinction between water
and other natural resources by arguing that the surface owner who used
groundwater did not have as great an ownership interest as did the captors
of gamebirds and minnows.4 In response, the Court granted that the
state's "greater ownership interest [in water] may not be irrelevant to
Commerce Clause analysis. . . .""I But that consideration did not remove
groundwater regulations from the scope of judicial review. The state's
argument was still based on a discredited legal fiction. Water was deemed a
marketable commodity, regardless of the pricing system governing its
allocation.50 Similarly, the importance of water to human survival did not
override constitutional considerations, even if the management of ground-
water was best left in state hands.51
Indeed, this aspect served to magnify the "interstate dimension '' 52 in
water use. The Court emphasized that over 80 percent of the nation's water
supply is used for agricultural purposes. 3 The markets supported by
irrigated farms spanned not only this country, but the world. The Court
could not see how allocation of such an important resource could be left
entirely in state hands.54 Moreover, the Court reasoned that removing
Nebraska groundwater from the status of an "article of commerce" would
curtail Congress' power to implement its own groundwater policies. This
was an unacceptable situation, given the national ramifications of ground-
water scarcity.55
The conclusion that groundwater is an article of commerce did not
answer the second matter before the Court-the alleged unconstitutional-
ity of the Nebraska statute. To address this problem, the Court turned to its
standard test of validity for state laws affecting interstate commerce. The
test, best enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,56 provides that:
[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
Natural Resources, 1979 SuP.CT.REv. 51, 90-91 (Hudson County of "doubtful validity" in light of
Geer's demise).
48. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3462.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 3462-63.
55. Id. at 3463, citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978).
56. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.5"
Nebraska offered one purpose for the statute-the conservation of
diminishing quantities of groundwater.5 8 Generally stated, the Court could
find no fault with this purpose. The Court also recognized that Nebraska's
concern was genuine, considering the inadequate water supply in the
region encompassing appellant's land-holdings. This concern was, in the
Court's view, fairly advanced by the first three conditions governing
interstate export of groundwater: that the withdrawal be reasonable,
conservative, and in the public interest. 60 Any incidental burden from a
prohibition on interstate transfers could be outweighed by a legitimate
conservation problem.61 And, the conditions were applied evenhandedly,
because the state imposed equally severe withdrawal and use restrictions
on its own citizens. 62 "[I]n the absence of a contrary view expressed by
Congress," the Court maintained, "we are reluctant to condemn as
unreasonable measures taken by a state to conserve and preserve for its own
citizens this vital resource in times of severe shortage. ' 63
The Court emphasized that the state's authority to regulate scarce
water supplies for the purpose of protecting public health and safety, but
not the health of an economy, was "at the core of its police power. '6 4
Within this range, a state could even restrict the interstate transfer of
water, or create a limited preference for its own citizens in the use of the
water, subject to any related federal statutes.6 5 That groundwater was even
available was testimony in part to Nebraska's program for protection of
that scarce resource.6 6 The Court concluded its facial analysis of the first
57. Id. at 142. This test has been criticized for vagueness; e.g., it does not define what interests
are "legitimate," or what kinds of effects are "incidental." More importantly, the test does not indicate
whether the failure to meet one of the test's three prongs by necessity renders the statute
unconstitutional, or whether state and national interests must be balanced. See Hellerstein, supra note
47, at 67 n. 85. Nevertheless, the Court has shown no inclination to depart from this subjective
standard. And, state legislation fails to meet the standard in almost every case where Pike is invoked.
Hellerstein, supra note 47, at 71.
58. Sporhase, 102 U.S. at 3463.
59. Id. at 3463-64. Applicant's land in Nebraska was located within a state-established
groundwater control area. The state and its subdivision had adopted several rules and regulations
controlling and directing the flow of scarce water supplies, including a limit on the intrastate transfer of
groundwater between separate surface tracts. Id.
60. Id. at 3464. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 613.01 (1978).
61. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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three statutory conditions with the recognition that they did not im-
permissably burden commerce. 7 Even the appellants had conceded as
much.6 8
The reciprocity provision, however, did not pass constitutional mus-
ter. Initially, the Court found that the provisions operated as an explicit
barrier against commerce, especially between Colorado and Nebraska,
because Colorado law explicitly forbids the export of groundwater from the
state under any conditions.6 9 Nebraska could not demonstrate that the
reciprocity provision bore a sufficiently close relationship to the legitimate
conservation rationale. The Court heard no evidence that the provision was
necessary to preserve scarce water resources. On the contrary, the Court
echoed Nebraska Chief Justice Krivosha's dissent"0 by observing that:
[e]ven though the supply of water in a particular well may be
abundant, or perhaps, even excessive, and even though the most
beneficial use of that water might be in another State, such water
may not be shipped into a neighboring State that does not permit
its water to be used in Nebraska. 1
But the Court left the door open:
If it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers from a water
shortage, that the intrastate transportation of water from areas
of abundance to areas of shortage is feasible regardless of
distance, and that the importation of water from adjoining States
would roughly compensate for any exportation to those States,
then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credi-
bly advanced for the reciprocity provision.7
The Court even speculated that a "demonstrably arid state" might be able
to justify a total ban on interstate transfers on conservation grounds,
assuming sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the claim.7 3 In the immedi-
ate case, however, the state could not marshall evidence to justify such a
ban, much less the need for reciprocity.74 In sum, the provision did not
survive the Court's strict scrutiny.
The Court could not rationalize the state's argument that an other-
wise impermissible burden on interstate commerce was somehow sanc-
tioned by a series of federal statutes and interstate compacts ratified by
67. Id. at 3464-65.
68. Id. at 3465.
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1974). See Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3465.
70. See supra note 17.
71. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3465.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
1983]
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Congress.75 That Congress could do so was not disputed, 7 but none of the
several statutes and compacts put forth in defense of the Nebraska statute
contained the express intent or policy to countenance an otherwise
unacceptable infringement upon commerce.7 Mere deference by Con-
gress to state water law was not enough to avoid the negative implications
of the commerce clause.7 8
In a brief dissent, Justice Rehnquist 79 took exception to that portion of
the Court's analysis concerning the relevancy of congressional regulation
of groundwater. In his view, Congress' power was already so far-reaching
that the federal government could regulate subject matter not considered
"articles of commerce." 80 But this was deemed irrelevant to the most
important question raised by the case-whether or not water was in fact
such an article of commerce. Essentially, Justice Rehnquist steered a
course opposite from the majority opinion, and argued that a state, by
exercising its quasi-sovereign authority to protect and preserve a natural
resource, could "preclude that resource from attaining the status of an
article of commerce."81 Rehnquist proferred a narrower conception: that
"commerce" could not be said to exist in a resource which could not be
owned as real property, and in which the state recognized only a limited
use-right.82 "Commerce," he concluded, "cannot exist in a natural
resource that cannot be sold, rented, traded or transferred, but only
used."' s Arguably, the gist of Justice Rehnquist's argument is analogous
to the restrictive views on the reach of the commerce clause espoused by
some members of the Court during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
75. Id. at 3465-66.
76. Id. at 3466 n. 21, citing Prudential Ins. Co. V. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (McCarran
Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945)); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (I.R.C. § 1606(a)
(1939); Whitefield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936) (Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1084 (1929)); In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (1890)).
77. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3466, citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S.Ct.
1096, 1102 (1982).
78. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3466. Having declared the reciprocity provision of the statute
unconstitutional, the Court remanded the case to the Nebraska Supreme Court for a determination
whether the invalid language was severable from the rest of the statute. Id. at 3467. On December 10,
1982, the Nebraska court heard arguments on the question. All parties maintained that the language is
severable. Letter from G. Roderic Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, State of Nebraska to the
author (Dec. 15, 1982). The court agreed. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 213 Neb. 484, 329
N.W.2d 855 (1983).
79. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in the dissent.
80. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-83 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
81. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3468.
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis his). Arguably, this distinction is somewhat nonsensical, because the use-right
can be sold, exchanged, etc., and it is the use-right which is in question.
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centuries."4 If Justice Rehnquist was trying to resurrect such a nostalgic
argument, however, he did not succeed in convincing the majority of the
worth of that argument.
III. THE AFTERMATH
Although Sporhase represents the first definitive ruling in over
seventy years on the constitutionality of water embargoes, it still raises as
many questions as may have been answered. Already, some commentators
have bemoaned the possible impact of this decision on the allocation of
water in the western states.8 5 These fears are not unjustifiable, but it would
be imprudent not to assess carefully all the ramifications of Sporhase, and
unwise not to design new legislation which serves the legitimate conserva-
tion rationale acceptable to the Court.
A. Current State Water Export Laws
Several western states regulate the interstate transfer of ground and
surface waters.8 6 Sporhase was concerned solely with groundwater, but an
extension of the reasoning to surface water follows afortiori. Indeed, the
majority opinion at one point states "that water is an article of com-
merce." 17 Thus, the scope of the decision is all-encompassing.
State regulations fall into three categories.88 Like Nebraska, several
84. Justice Rehnquist appears to have resurrected the late Justice Holmes' notion that until
natural resources are "captured" and reduced to possession, they cannot be considered "articles of
commerce." See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,600-03 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(natural gas is not an article of commerce until reduced to possession).
85. See, e.g., The Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in Sporhase versus Nebraska:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources ofthe Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as Sporhase Hearings] 151-52 (statement of Interstate
Conference on Water Problems); D. Bradley, Western Water in Court (Nov. 1982) (unpublished
paper); Unsigned legal memorandum, law firm of Brown, Roady, Bonzillian, and Gold, Deficiencies in
the Effort in Senator Wallop's Amendments to S. 1844 to Protect State Water Law (Aug. 3,1982). Ms.
Bradley, a former Montana legislator, is currently Democratic National Committeewoman for
Montana. The firm of Brown, Roady, Bonzillian, and Gold represented the Kansas City Southern
Railroad, the Sierra Club, and the National Farmers' Union in lobbying against federal coal slurry
pipeline legislation in 1982. See Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 12, 1982, at 7-A, col. 4.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92. Some eastern states and the District of Columbia
do regulate the export of water. See White, Reasonable State Regulation of the Interstate Transfer of
Percolating Water, 2 NAT. REs. LAw 383, 385 n. 11 (1969). This Comment will concentrate on the
more controversial statutes in the western states. For additional discussion of the western states' export
control laws, see Clyde, State Prohibitions on the Interstate Exportation of Scarce Water Resources,
53 U.CoLo.L.REv. 529 (1982); Comment, Coal Slurry: All Quiet on the Western Front? 3
PuB.LA D.L.REv. 156 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Coal Slurry]; Note, Interstate
Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 U.TEx.L.REv. 1249 (1982);
Comment, Do State Water Anti-Exportation Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause? or Will New
Mexico's Embargo Law Hold Water? 21 NAT. REs. J. 617 (1981).
87. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3463 (emphasis added).
88. See Clyde, supra note 86, at 530.
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states condition export of water beyond their boundaries on a reciprocal
basis. "' Three states have banned the interstate export of some waters. 90 In
addition, two states-Montana and Oklahoma-have specific statutory
prohibitions against the use of in-state water in coal slurry pipelines. 1
Finally, six states condition interstate transfers upon approval of their
respective legislatures." Nearly all these states are in the region commonly
referred to as the "Great Plains"-or, as it was more aptly described by
nineteenth century government explorer Stephen M. Long, the "Great
American Desert."9 "
Two of these statutes have already been challenged in courts.
Montana's conditional embargo94 was the focus of a suit filed in federal
district court in 1973, alleging that the law was in violation of commerce
clause. 95 The parties contesting the statute later amended their complaint,
89. CAL. WATER CODE § 1230 (West 1971) (streams); IDAHO CODE § 42-408 (1977) (all
waters); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-726 (1977) (groundwater); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233.01 (surface
waters), 46-613.01 (groundwater) (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533-515 (1979) (permits for appropria-
tion when point of diversion is outside state or lands to be irrigated are outside state); S.D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1982) (waters for domestic use or irrigation within any state having common
boundary with South Dakota); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962)
(all waters). A Utah statute gives the state engineer authority to allow interstate diversions only after
the engineer evaluates and publicizes "the advantages to the State of Utah and its citizens of exporting
water." UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (1980).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1982) (surface waters-agricultural uses in adjacent
states allowed if land therein is owned by Colorado landowner, but only upon authorization of state
legislature); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1974) (groundwater); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.520 (1979)
(no permits for change of use or transfer of water and water rights "as to such waters as shall have been
prior to March 23, 1951, and which are now diverted in Nevada and which were prior to March 23,
1951, and now are used for domestic or industrial purposes [outside Nevada]"); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
72-12-19 (1978) (groundwater). An Arizona statute gives state authorities power to grant permits for
interstate diversions, but gives them "discretion" to "decline to issue a permit if the point of diversion is
within the state but the place of beneficial use is in some other state." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-
153B (Supp. 1982-1983).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 7.6 (West Supp. 1981-
82). Nevertheless, both states do allow construction of coal pipelines under other statutes. MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 69-13-101, -102, -201, -302, -303 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 7.1-7.5 (West
Supp. 1981-82). See Comment, Coal Slurry, supra note 86, at 158-59.
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981) (all waters); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-233.01 (1978)
(surface waters; reciprocity also required); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 46-5-20.1 (Supp. 1982) (applications
for any waters in excess of 10,000 acre feet annually); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1085.2(2) (West
Supp. 1981-82); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1981) (all waters); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3105 (1977) (all
waters). A similar Texas statute, declared unconstitutional by the federal district court in City of Altus
v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), affdper curiarn, 385 U.S. 35 (1966), was repealed by the Texas
legislature in 1971. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 658.
93. K. TOOLE, THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS: NORTHWEST AMERICA, CATTLE, AND COAL 23
(1976).
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981).
95. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, No. 1184 (D. Mont. filed June,
1973). See Martz & Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and Water Rights-The Slurry Issue, 23
RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33, 63 (1977).
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alleging instead that the law had been impliedly repealed by adoption of an
interstate water compact in 1951.96 Presumably, this amendment to the
pleadings removed the constitutional issue from the court's
consideration.9 7
A New Mexico statute forbidding the export of groundwater was
successfully attacked on commerce clause grounds in City of El Paso v.
Reynolds,98 decided in January of 1983. The federal district court hearing
the case drew heavily from the Sporhase decision to justify striking down
the statute.99 The importance of this recent case will be addressed later. 100
At this juncture, it is instructive to make some observations about the
constitutionality of all the embargo statutes.
Clearly, all the laws must now survive scrutiny under the Pike test.
Water resources will be treated as articles of commerce, despite the
"greater ownership interest" a state has in those resources. 101 That several
western states claim ownership of in-state waters in their constitutions or in
statutes 0 2 is generally irrelevant to commerce clause analysis.1 03 Thus,
states with a reciprocity statute like Nebraska's face almost instant court
challenges if the transferee state enacts some barrier to sharing water with
the transferor state. Only if that state can supply evidence of a critical
water shortage, along the lines suggested by the Court, 04 can its reciproc-
ity provision survive the gauntlet of judicial review.
A similar analysis should hold true for states conditioning water
exports by legislative approval, especially if intrastate transfers do not
require such approval. The decision in City of Altus already mandates this
outcome, and Sporhase resolves any doubts about the legal significance of
the former decision. But a provision allowing legislative disapproval of
96. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, No. 1184 (D. Mont. filed June,
1973, amended complaint, Oct. 1980).
97. Ladd, supra note 47, at 309 n. 228.
98. Civ. No. 80-730 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983) (memorandum opinion).
99. Id. at 1, 25-36.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 113-122.
101. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3462.
102. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; WYo.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-131 (Supp. 1980); CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West
1971); IDAHO CODE § 42-101 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. §
533.025 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-18 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 60 (West 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 46-
1-3 (1967); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon 1972); UTAH WATER CODE ANN. § 73-1-1
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.010 (1962).
103. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3462. See also Martz & Grazis, supra note 95, at 49; Goldberg,
Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13, 22 (1964).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. Even the most vehement critics of the Court's
decision would have to agree that reciprocity provisions like those in the Nebraska statute, broadly
drafted, make little sense from the standpoint of beneficial use.
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some or all interstate transfers or sales of water may be permissible even
under Sporhase if it is narrowly tailored to the goal of conserving water for
public health and safety."°5
The unconditional embargo invites almost immediate suspicion be-
cause of its facially discriminatory nature. Yet the majority in Sporhase
recognized that a state could justify such a ban, assuming that the state
could again produce evidence of a severe shortage. 10 6 It is this possibility
that may have convinced the Court not to overrule expressly Hudson
County. Nevertheless, contrary to Justice Holmes' judgment, the sover-
eign must now answer "for its will"'1 07 to the courts if the evidence of
shortage is challenged.
B. "Public" versus "Economic" Health: Sporhase and the City of
El Paso Decision
A crucial point raised in Sporhase was whether a state is limited to a
showing of shortages detrimental to the health and safety of its citizens, or
whether it can justify export restrictions by a conscious choice to allocate
existing water resources rationally to preserve present and future economic
activity. Western states in particular have long justified legitimate conser-
vation goals through the concept of "beneficial use." 08 According to Dean
Trelease, such use means not just one valuable to the appropriator, but
"reasonable and economic. .. in view of other present and future demands
upon the source of supply."' 09 Could a state support either a conditional or
absolute ban on the export of water if it could establish that, after all
existing and future uses are considered, such export would be wasteful and
105. Cf. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3464 (Court is "reluctant to condemn as unreasonable measures
taken by a state to conserve shortage.") Nevertheless, a provision for legislative approval could be
challenged on due process and equal protection grounds if the provision was utilized arbitrarily to
disapprove of one export proposal at one time, while used on another occasion to ratify a similar
proposal. See McDaniel, Commerce Clause and Water Availability Issues Concerning Coal Slurry
Pipelines, 12 NAT. RES. LAW 533, 542 (1979) (suggesting that different treatment of Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc. and Texas Eastern slurry pipeline proposals by Wyoming legislture could
be attacked as unreasonably arbitrary). Any legislative approval scheme must be designed in such a
way as to keep politically-motivated discretion to an absolute minimum-arguably a Herculean task.
106. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
107. See Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357.
108. The concept of beneficial use developed concurrently with the prior appropriation doctrine
in the western states during the nineteenth century. Basically, the concept refers to the use of a quantity
of water in a reasonable and prudent manner. It is a concept uniquely suited to the arid western states,
where all water uses must be measured carefully against the demands of man and nature. For a brief
history of the beneficial use requirement, see Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in
State Water Rights Law, in I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 85-87 (R.E. Clark ed. 1967).
109. Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12
Wyo. L.J. 1, 16 (1957).
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therefore "non-beneficial?"' 10
Arguably, this question has already been answered in the negative.
The Sporhase majority did not include a state's economic health within the
definition of public health and safety.11' Legislation designed to protect
particular economic interests would probably be considered unwarranted
economic protectionism."' This point was hammered home in a more
recent decision by a lower federal court. In City of El Paso v. Reynolds,'"3
the federal district court of New Mexico declared that state's ban on the
interstate transfer of groundwater"" unconstitutional and enjoined en-
forcement of the statute against the city of El Paso, Texas, which has been
seeking groundwater from beneath a tract in New Mexico to supply the
city's municipal and business needs. 1 5
In reaching this decision, the district court drew heavily upon the
reasoning in Sporhase."81 Clearly, the statute was facially discriminatory,
but the court was willing to consider evidence that it served a legitimate
local purpose, was narrowly tailored to serve that purpose, and that no
adequate non-discriminatory alternatives were available. 17 Although the
court was impressed with the intricacy of New Mexico's water laws and
their relationship to conservation, it did not find this to be a sufficient
justification for supporting an unconditional ban on groundwater ex-
port." ' Pointing to Sporhase, the court noted a distinction between public
health and safety and economic protectionism, and concluded that "a state
110. Cf. Ladd, supra note 47, at 311 (suggesting that the "more appropriate approach" to export
regulation would be "to prohibit those wasteful or inefficient uses of water whether they be in-state or
out-of-state"). Arguably, this is the approach the Montana Legislature adopted when implementing a
ban on the use of water in coal slurry pipelines. See Comment, Coal Slurry, supra note 86, at 158-61.
111. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. 3464.
112. Id., citing H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). The Court has been
remarkably consistent in striking down state laws consciously or unconsciously designed to further
local economic interests. As Professor Tribe has noted, "[t]he central thrust of the Supreme Court's
work in the area of federal-state relations has been to "put the inertia on the other side-on the side of
the centralizing forces of nationhood and union." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 319
(1978).
113. No. 80-730 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983) (memorandum opinion).
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978) provides that "[n]o person shall withdraw water from
any underground source in New Mexico for use in any other state by drilling a well in New Mexico and
transporting the water outside the state or by drilling a well outside the boundaries of New Mexico and
pumping water from under lands lying within the boundaries of New Mexico. "
115. City of El Paso, No. 80-730 HB, at 4-5, 36.
116. Id. at 1, 25-36. The court rejected a defense by the State of New Mexico that the Rio
Grande Compact of 1938, 53 Stat. 785 (1939), established congressional approval for an embargo on
thetransfer of New Mexico groundwater. Cityof El Paso, No. 80-730 HB, at 10-24. Thecourt found no
evidence that the compact apportioned the surface waters of the Rio Grande River between New
Mexico and Texas, or that the same compact controlled the use of groundwater hydrologically related
to the river. Id.
117. Id. at 26, citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
118. City of El Paso, No. 80-730 HB, at 27-28.
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may discriminate in favor of its citizens only to the extent that water is
essential to human survival. Outside fulfilling human survival needs, water
is an economic resource."119 As for the state's argument that a ban could be
sustained on the grounds that future requirements would be shortchanged
by a present transfer, the court responded that:
[t]his predicted shortage is based on what defendants [New
Mexico and others] define as reasonable "public welfare" needs,
including water requirements for municipalities, industry, irri-
gated agriculture, energy production, fish and wildlife, and
recreation. Aside from the amounts necessary for public health
and safety, these are requirements for water related to economic
activities. In essence, defendants recognize no limits on the
future uses for which New Mexico should be able to preserve
groundwater. However, to extend the state's power to discrimi-
nate to all potential uses of water would remove groundwater
from Commerce Clause restraints. The policy of maximizing all
"'public welfare" uses of water in New Mexico, and the further-
ing of that policy by prohibiting interstate commerce in ground-
water, is tantamount to economic protectionism.10
In short, New Mexico could impose the same transfer and use
regulations on out-of-state users as it did on its own citizens. 2' It could not,
however, condition the export of groundwater merely because its irrigated
agriculture economy might have to take second place to the growing
municipal and industrial uses in Texas.'22
C. The Montana Coal Slurry Statute: A Case Study in Dubious
Constitutionality
The rationale adopted by the court in City of El Paso is equally
applicable to statutes banning the export of surface waters. A Montana
statute, for example forbids the use of water in a coal slurry pipeline by
removing it from the category of beneficial uses.'2 ' The statute avoids
facial discrimination by denying use of water to an intrastate, as well as an
interstate, pipeline. 24 But it is likely that, in light of Sporhase and City of
119. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 31.
122. Id. at 32. The court concluded that "there is no present or imminent shortage of water in
New Mexico for health and safety needs." Id.
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1981) provides: "Slurry transport of coal. (1) The
legislature finds that the use of water for the slurry transport of coal is detrimental to the conservation
and protection of the water resources of the state. (2) The use of water for the slurry transport of coal is
not a beneficial use of water."
124. Id. An earlier version of the statute provided that the "use of water for slurry to export coal
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El Paso, the beneficial use route would still be seen as a circumvention,
however innocent, of the dictates of the commerce clause. 12 5
A major reason for adopting the statute was a fear of adverse
economic and environmental impacts on existing and reasonably foresee-
able uses of water.' 26  Considered in light of Hudson County, this
justification is judicially acceptable. But, as noted previously, Sporhase
and its first offspring carry the Supreme Court's fears of economic
protectionism over to the realm of water, insofar as the available water
constitutes an "economic resource." The absence of a complete inventory
of water resources in the state 27 does suggest that the Montana legislature
was not acting unreasonably in forbidding some uses, at least during a brief
time for conducting such an inventory. There is some evidence now,
however, that sufficient water may be available for slurry transport and
other development uses.128 At the very least, a permanent ban on the use of
from Montana is not a beneficial use" of water. 1974 Mont. Laws ch 192 (repealed 1979) (emphasis
added). This version was clearly discriminatory and was criticized as such by some commentators. See
Tarlock, supra note 47, at 539; McDaniel, supra note 105, at 454. Nevertheless, the avoidance of facial
discrimination has been deemed artificial by at least one commentator. According to this argument,
there is at least a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce from a ban on water use in slurry
pipelines, because most pipelines are feasible only on an interstate scale. See McDaniel, supra note 105,
at 544. Another writer has suggested that short intrastate lines might be possible, "and do generate
benefits which [would be] foregone by the prohibiting state." Comment, Do State Restrictions on
Water Use by Slurry Pipelines Violate the Commerce Clause?, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 655,672 (1982).
Cf. C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, WATER RIGHTS AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE YELLOWSTONE
RIVER BASIN: AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS 122 (1980) (discussing success of short-distance "Black
Mesa" Slurry pipeline currently in operation between Arizona and Nevada).
How a court will resolve this problem is an open question. As noted earlier, one cannot predict with
certainty where the United States Supreme Court will go everytime the Pike rationale is invoked to
analyse questionable state legislation. See Hellerstein, supra note 57, at 71. But see discussion infra
note 125.
125. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Sporhase, this author was convinced that the
Montana statute could survive a commerce clause challenge. Comment, Coal Slurry, supra note 86, at
162-71. This conclusion was based on a fusion of principles from Hudson County and modern
commerce clause case law. This author speculated that water would be deemed an article of commerce,
and that laws controlling the export of water would be scrutinized under the Pike test, but that a court
would still give great weight to a state's interest in water resources for the physical health of its citizens
and the viability of its existing and future economic base. In view of Sporhase and City of El Paso,
however, this author is obviously no longer comfortable with his earlier assessment, and is therefore
inclined to reject it. See also Clyde, supra note 86, at 552 (defining certain uses of water as non-
beneficial still invites a commerce clause challenge). But there are still a few adherents to the "old-time
religion." See Minutes of the Montana State House of Representatives Committee on Natural
Resources, Hearings on House Bills 893, 894, and 908, Mar. 16, 1983 [hereinafter referred to as
Hearings on Montana Water Marketing Legislation] (statements by attorneys Mike Meloy and
Sharon Morrison that coal slurry law is still constitutional even under Sporhase).
126. See Comment, Coal Slurry, supra note 86, at 160-61.
127. See Ladd, supra note 47, at 267. Several preliminary studies on water resources in the
Yellowstone River Basin conflict as to whether there is a sufficient supply for all conceivable uses in the
area. C. BoRis & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 124, at 9.
128. See M Tor. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, A WATER PROTECTION
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water in slurry pipelines, without a sincere effort to document available
water resources, is probably suspect.
Montana's policy on slurry pipelines may be contradictory in that it
indirectly encourages consumption of coal for energy production in the
state in thermal generating plants-a far more consumptive use of water
than use in a slurry pipeline.12 9 The recurrent talk of forbidding slurry
transport in order to assist the state's railroad industry raises a hint of
protectionist sentiment.13 0 Finally, Montana's other anti-export statute,
which allows interstate transfers of water with legislative approval,' 3 '
suggests that the state legislature cannot argue that it has carefully
considered the ramifications of its stated conservation policy. A court
confronted with a challenge to the slurry statute might have a hard time
understanding why the state bans one type of interstate transfer of water,
but not others.
Conceivably, in-state interests opposed to coal slurry could rely on the
Yellowstone River Compact13 2 to forbid transfer of water from the
southeastern Montana coal fields. Under the terms of Article X of the
Compact, interstate transfers outside the river basin must have the
STRATEGY FOR MONTANA-MISSOURI RIVER BASIN 27 (Sept. 1982) [hereinafter cited as DNRC
WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY STUDY]. Gary Fritz, administrator of the water resource division of
the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation [DNRC] estimated in early 1983 that
300,000 acre-feet of water per year could be made available to the state from the Fort Peck Reservoir, a
federal water storage project, for various industrial uses such as coal slurry. Minutes, Water Marketing
Conference, Montana Environmental Quality Council (Jan. 11, 1983) (author's copy). DNRC is
authorized by statute to purchase water from this reservoir. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-205 (198 1). See
also C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 124, at 40 (discussion of federal government offer of Fort
Peck water to Montana in 1976).
129. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, COAL SLURRY PIPELINES: PROGRESS
AND PROBLEMS FOR NEW ONES 7 (1979). Ted Doney, former director of DNRC and a current advocate
of water marketing, estimates that the amount of water consumed per million tons of coal in a thermal
steam-generating plant is approximately 3,500 acre feet. This compares with 370-750 acre-feet per
million tons of coal for a modest coal slurry line. Doney argues that if slurry pipelines were used to move
coal out of Montana instead of burning it here, water could be saved and the state would not have to
contend with the environmental impacts from power plants. Minutes, "Water Issues Facing
Montanans" (Montana State University Water Resources Research Center) (Dec. 3, 1982) (author's
copy). For a discussion of the heated battle between agriculturalists (in union with environmentalists)
and industrial interests over strip mining and siting of power plants in rural Montana, see K. TOOLE,
supra note 93.
130. A recent Montana legislative hearing on three water-marketing proposals attracted
representatives of railroad management and labor who, in a rare display of unity, argued vehemently
against any plan to market coal in slurry pipelines. Both sides fear the competition would result in lost
revenues and jobs, Hearings on Montana Water Marketing Legislation, supra note 125. That several
legislators in attendance were more impressed with the industry's arguments than the legal and
environmental issues was readily obvious from the speeches and commentary. Id.
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981) gives the legislature authority to permit interstate
transfers.
132. Act of Oct. 30, 1951, ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663 (1951).
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unanimous consent of the signatory states to the Compact.1 3 Presumably,
Montana could exercise its veto power and prevent interbasin transfers of
water in slurry lines-a move that would effectively prohibit this method of
transporting coal to market, because most of the coal mined in Montana is
located within the Yellowstone Basin.134 The resulting "burden" on
commerce would be defended by pointing to congressional ratification of
the Compact. Congress can, by statute or compact, permit what would
otherwise have been an unreasonable burden on commerce. 13 5
How defensible the Compact defense would prove is a matter of
conjecture. In Sporhase, the Court emphasized that congressional consent
to the unilateral imposition of burdens must be "expressly stated."' 36
Arguably, the language of and history behind the Yellowstone Compact
reveal no such consent. Article X has already been attacked by some as an
unreasonable burden,13 7 and future litigation may yet render the Compact
ineffective as a means of prohibiting interstate transfers of water. Congress
may also moot the issue if it ever grants federal eminent domain power to
coal slurry pipeline companies-a move some westerners see as the first
step toward securing a federal hand on the water faucet.13 8
The growing apprehension over Sporhase has already convinced some
133. Id. (Art. X). See also Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Intake Water Co., 484 F. Supp. 36,45 (D. Mont.
1979) (each signatory state can control every aspect of appropriations under the Compact); 38 Op.
MONT. ATT'Y GEN. No. 18, 1-4 (1979) (diversion of water under Article X requires consent of all states
privy to the Compact). See generally Comment, The Yellowstone River Compact:An Overview, 3 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 179 (1982).
134. The Fort Union Coal Formation, which covers roughly all of southern Saskatchewan,
western North Dakota, eastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming, contains approximately 1.3
trillion tons of coal, of which between 40 and 50 billion tons are in the eastern Montana component. K.
TOOLE, supra note 93, at 13-14. The Yellowstone River Basin covers a large portion of this component.
See DNRC WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY STUDY, supra note 128, at 2-5.
135. See cases cited supra note 76.
136. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3466 (citations omitted).
137. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, No. 1184 (D. Mont. filed June
29, 1973). See also Clyde, supra note 86 at 543. Recently, the Yellowstone River Pipeline Company
filed suit in federal district court in Wyoming challenging Montana laws governing interstate
diversions of water, but naming all the signatory states to the Yellowstone Compact as defendants. The
federal court transferred the suit to Montana District Court, contending that only Montana's laws are
in dispute. Great Falls Tribune, Apr. 11, 1983, at 9-A, col. 3. No further action has been taken as of this
writing.
138. For a brief history of proposed federal eminent domain legislation and the strong opposition
to it, see Comment, Coal Slurry, supra note 86, at 171-76. In recent years, supporters of eminent
domain legislation have been picking up more support for a federal role. As of this writing, a new
proposal has just passed the House of Representatives Interior Committee. Great Falls Tribune, Apr.
7, 1983, at 12-B, col. 1. And, as in past years, a coalition of western politicians, agriculturalists,
environmentalists, and railroad interests will come together to push for defeat of the legislation or, in
the alternative, soften its impact with placatory amendments. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 528, 97TH CONG.,
2D SESS. 12-18, 31-32 (1982) (discussion of amendments to S. 1844, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
dealing with primacy of state water law).
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Montanans to repeal both of the state's anti-export laws and enact a
comprehensive water marketing scheme.1"9 Interest in this new approach
has been buoyed by the agreement between the State of South Dakota and
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI), a slurry pipeline company,
to market some 10,000 acre feet per year of water from the Oahe Reservoir
in South Dakota for a slurry pipeline based in Wyoming. "1 0 Montana
Governor Ted Schwinden, the State Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation (DNRC), and some legislators and water development
advocates argue that Montana must pursue a similar development policy if
it is to avoid losing water to downstream states and their water use
programs. "1 The possibility of a slurry pipeline based in Montana has
already been discussed." 2
Generally, water marketing proposals now under consideration envi-
sion carefully planned and coordinated transfers of water under a contract
or similar means of conveyance.14 3 Applicants for Montana water would
have to pay the state for an export permit.14 4 Revenue from sales of water
would be devoted to a number of uses, including development of water
projects, soil conservation, and general fund expenditures.14 5 Legislative
approval would be required for each sale agreement and permit," with
contracts or leases terminating after a specified period.147
Those proposals have stirred up a hornets' nest of opposition among
agricultural, railroad, and environmental interests. 48 Many opponents
139. See H.B. 893,48th Leg., Regular Sess. (1983); H.B. 894,48th Leg., Regular Sess. (1983);
H.B. 908, 48th Leg., Regular Sess. (1983).
140. For a discussion of the ETSI proposal, see DNRC WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY STUDY,
supra note 128, at 6-7.
141. Great Falls Tribune, Mar. 15, 1983, at 1-A, col. 1.
142. Great Falls Tribune, Apr. 3,1983, at 1 -A, cols. 2-3. Powder River Pipeline Company, the
organization interested in construction of a Montana based slurry line, will probably not begin
construction, if at all, until the late 1980's. Hearing on Montana Water Marketing Legislation, supra
note 125 (statement of Leo Berry, director of DNRC). Montana Governor Ted Schwinden has
predicted that the "major pressure seeking Montana water will not come from coal slurry pipelines but
from rapidly growing urban areas in the [western United States]." Great Falls Tribune, Mar. 30,1983,
at 2-A, col. 1.
143. See H.B. 893, supra note 139, § 6, at 12-15; H.B. 893, supra note 139, § 7, at 13-16.
144. See, e.g., H.B. 893, supra note 139, §§ 4, 5, and 6.
145. Id., § 7, at 15-16 (50 percent to water development projects, 25 percent to long range soil
and water conservation programs, and 25 percent to state general fund).
146. H.B. 893, supra note 139, § 6(5), at 14 (forty years); H.B. 894, supra note 139, § 7(9), at
15.
147. Id., (forty-five years).
148. See Hearings on Montana Water Marketing Legislation, supra note 125 (statements of
Burlington Northern Railroad, various railway unions, Sierra Club, Northern Plains Resource
Council, Montana Environmental Information Center, and several local agricultural preservation
groups). But some organizations have come to support some type of water marketing proposal,
especially if the revenues from an interstate sale are devoted to instate irrigation and storage projects.
Id. (statements of Montana Stockgrowers' Association, Women Involved in Farm Economics, and
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have argued that the impact of Sporhase is not well known, and that
perhaps Montana's anti-export laws only need "shoring up."149 If the
interest of these groups is to prevent industrialization from interfering with
the existing agricultural base, then the opposition is futile. Sporhase and
its retinue do not envision protection of an economic activity as a legitimate
conservation goal. Some opponents have recognized this fact and have
suggested that the legislature amend its laws, but only after a thorough
inventory of Montana's water resources. 50 Any upcoming water export
proposals would hopefully await a completed inventory.' 51 Although this
approach has been criticized by advocates of immediate water market-
ing, 5 2 a rush into the latter policy is not without legal and political
problems.153
Montana Farmers' Union).
149. Id. An attorney and former legislator argued that Sporhase may not seriously affect
Montana's ban on water use in slurry pipelines because that decision was (1) about groundwater only
and not surface water; (2) concerned with reciprocity clauses and not beneficial use statutes; and (3)
supportive of a conservation rationale for expert control laws. While these arguments were received
warmly by opponents of water marketing, they are undoubtedly the product of limited research. That
the reasoning of Sporhase is easily extended to all waters and all means of regulating their interstate
transfer seems unquestionable. And, the "conservation" rationale is not as broad as some have been led
to believe. See supra text accompanying notes 86-122. Of course, the attorney's arguments may be the
basis of a future defense of Montana's statute, should it ever be challenged in court.
150. See H.B. 908, 48th Legis., Regular Sess. (1983) (bringing slurry pipeline construction
under the Major Facility Siting Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-20-101 to -1205 (1981); requiring
legislative approval for water permits of 10,000 acre-feet or more per year; requiring two-year study of
impacts of water marketing). H.B. 908, if passed, would also repeal the existing law requiring
legislative approval for interstate water exports. Id., § 9, at 19. The ban on water use in slurry pipelines
would continue. H.B. 893, supra note 139, if passed, would revise the procedures for legislative
approval and prohibit the use of water in slurry pipelines only until July 1, 1987. Id., §§ 3, 9. H.B. 894,
supra note 139, contains similar revisions regarding legislative approval, but repeals the slurry statute
outright. Id. §§ 3, 24.
151. H.B. 908 does provide a mechanism for legislative approval of large scale water marketing
proposals (except for coal slurry pipelines). Id. § 8, at 16-19. Nevertheless, the provisions for a two-year
study of impacts associated with such proposals suggests that the state legislature would not seriously
consider major proposals until the study was completed. Other requirements in the bill providing for
extensive review of proposals by state water resource agencies prior to legislative approval virtually
assure a two-year de facto moratorium on water exports.
152. Hearings on Montana Water Marketing Legislation, supra note 125 (statements of Leo
Berry, Director of DNRC; Ted Doney, former director of DNRC; Ken Kelly, lobbyist for the Montana
Water Development Association; Mike Fitzgerald, director of the Montana International Trade
Commission). Generally, proponents of "immediate" marketing want the state to follow South
Dakota's example by authorizing reasonable projects now for both short-term and long-term benefits.
In the short-run, the state could realize significant revenues for various in-state projects. In the long
run, in addition to maximizing revenues, the state would establish a priority for consumptive water uses
that would improve the chances for retaining waters within the state after any future congressional or
court apportionment of waters in the Greater Missouri River Basin. Thus, the sooner Montana enters
the water marketing business, the better. See infra discussion in note 157.
153. Opponents of H.B. 893 and 894 claim that the provisions in both bills for marketing water
could run afoul of an equal protection challenge. According to this argument, both bills would allow the
DNRC to obtain water use permits for subsequent sale or transfer to private companies after certain
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
What the western states do over the next few years is certainly an open
question. What is not open is the fact that the states must change their anti-
export laws. Despite the opinion of one water law expert that Sporhase
itself takes "the first steps" toward "reinforc[ing] existing state water law
structures,"'154 the steps are indeed small. The fear of "economic Balkani-
zation," a frequently raised concern in commerce clause case law,'55 will
apparently apply to water as to other commodities. This leaves the states in
the position of seriously rethinking their laws. It also puts Congress in the
position of deciding whether, in the interests of "states' rights," it will pass
legislation sanctioning the export restriction schemes frowned upon by the
Court,'56 or whether it will "one-up" the Court by federalizing the whole of
water law. Either course of action is bound to be controversial. 7
environmental conditions were satisfied. Yet those same companies could not obtain permits outright,
without the intermediate stage of DNRC approval, even though they would have to meet the same
conditions. See Hearings on Montana Water Marketing Legislation, supra note 125 (statement of
Rep. Dan Kemmis). Arguably, a challenge based on equal protection grounds might be meritorious.
States will have to examine any proposed marketing procedures for unreasonable discrimination in the
treatment of water customers.
154. Letter from Gary L. Widman, of counsel to Fulbright & Jaworski, Washington, D.C., to
Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R.-Wyo. (Sept. 14, 1982) (discussing impact of Sporhase).
155. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,325-26 (1979) (Commerce clause reflects a
"central concern. . .to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization .... .
156. See S. REP. No. 528, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., 16-17 (1982) (discussion of proposed coal
slurry legislation and amendments designed to protect state water laws in light of Sporhase).
Arguably, many federal officials concerned with the Sporhase decision do not yet appreciate its
potential impact on state water laws. Compare Sporhase Hearings, supra note 85, at 8-9 (statement of
Carol Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Div'n, Dep't of Justice)(arguing that most states could probably justify existing export control laws afterSporhase) with id. at
151-52 (statement of Interstate Conference on Water Problems) (arguing that Court's disdain for
economic protectionism jeopardizes these same laws). See supra text accompanying notes 108-122.
157. Adding to the controversy in a potential donnybrook between upstream and downstream
states along the Missouri River over water rights. The controversy began in late 1981 when the state of
South Dakota entered into its now infamous water sale contract with Energy Transportation Systems,
Inc., (ETSI). Several downstream states, especially Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska, perceive upper
basin development as a threat to future water development projects in their region. Upstream states
claim a preference for current consumptive uses under the terms of the Federal Flood Control Act of
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534,58 Stat. 887 (1944), and the O'Mahoney-Millikan Amendment to that Act,
id. at § 1 (b). Two lawsuits have already been filed by downstream states, urging a halt to the ETSI
proposal and a reinterpretation of the Flood Control Act to favor water uses in the downstream basin.
See Missouri v. Andrews, No. - (D. Neb., filed Aug. 1982); Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Andrews,
No. - (D. Neb., filed Aug. 1982). See also DNRC WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY STUDY,
supra note 128, at 6-8. Opponents of water marketing in Montana cite those lawsuits as a warning to
the state not to provoke any further controversy until some kind of intrabasin allocation agreement can
be reached. See Hearings on Montana Water Marketing Legislation, supra note 125 (Statement of
Rep. Dan Kemmis).
The so-called High Plains Study, authorized by Congress to study methods of recharging the
nearly depleted Ogalla Aquifer which underlies Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New
Mexico, and Texas, see 42 U.S.C. § 1962d- 18 (1976), also poses a potential threat to water supplies in
the upstream states, because the only long-term solution to water depletion in the area is importation of
water from the Missouri River. See DNRC WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY STUDY, supra note 128, at
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IV. CONCLUSION
To the careful observer, the result in Sporhase should not have been
too surprising. That water would eventually be deemed an article of
commerce has been a safe bet among water law afficionados for years.,,"
What was uncertain was the limit the Court would put on a state's power to
regulate the export of water. Hudson County remains good law insofar as a
state has the right to constrain and even prohibit the interstate transfer of
water in the event of a crisis affecting public health and safety. But
Sporhase and the subsequent decision in City of El Paso clearly are a
victory for economic interests that would desire "excess" water-that
amount above the amount necessary for health and safety-for present and
future development projects in the western United States. States may be
able to make the best of this situation by marketing some water to out-of-
state interests for a price, and using the proceeds to develop water
conservation programs and projects in the state. Admittedly, new lawsuits
may arise challenging the extent of changes in western water law, but the
general course for the future does seem permanently fixed.
Courts cannot and will not necessarily speak the last words on
regulation of interstate water transfers. They can at best define the
parameters within which legislatures, industry, agriculturalists, environ-
mentalists, and the general public can operate. And yet, in defining
parameters, the courts may be solving nothing. There is something to be
said for the judiciary's frequent pronouncements-echoed in
Sporhase-that "our economic unit is the nation," 159 and that unreasona-
ble prohibitions on the export of water are not in the best interests of a
nation of states. Nevertheless, the courts, by seemingly pursuing a
relentless logic in commerce clause cases, may be doing the opposite or
what they intend. Quite often-and the battle over water law is no
exception-the commerce clause is invoked as a protective shield by one
economic interest against another, without regard to the respective worth
of each interest. In City of ElPaso, the district court noted that the transfer
of New Mexico groundwater would, in the long run, bring about the demise
of that state's irrigated agriculture economy at the expense of expanding
municipal and industrial uses in Texas.1 60 Perhaps this outcome is right.
But perhaps it is wrong, too, considering the realm of thought which
questions where our current economic wisdom-in part protected by the
Constitution-is leading us. The Supreme Court reminds us from time to
7.
158. See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 47, at 310.
159. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1948).
160. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983) (memorandum
opinion) at 32.
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time that our Constitution "was founded upon the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division."' 161 But if the
"prosperity and salvation" are in reality short-lived, and for the benefit of a
few at the expense of the many, we may be entitled to ask where the
judiciary is taking us. Despite the Court's trite pronouncements, there is no
advantage in sinking together.
It may well be true that, when the smoke of battle is cleared, water
supplies in the American West will be plentiful, and that they can be shared
by the states in such a way as to promote the elusive "public good."'1 2
Events may prove, however, that our current wisdom respecting the
commerce clause-especially with respect to a precious resource like
water-may operate in such a twisted fashion as to lead our economic order
down a path of destruction. This wisdom reflects an unshakeable faith in
the foundations of the existing order, and a curious optimism regarding the
ability of society to adapt easily to economic and technological change.
Now is the time to decide whether or not our vision of the current order is
myopic. If it is, then consideration of humanly achievable alternatives is
warranted. 163 And these are general welfare matters best left to legislative,
and not judicial, deliberations.
At the very least, caution should be the watchword as the states, the
federal government, and the courts plan the West's water future. Water is
the lifeblood of the region. The inhabitants of this arid country cannot
afford to sacrifice long-term survival for short term (and short-sighted)
gain. To do otherwise would be tantamount to repeating the error of Esau,
who sold his priceless birthright as leader of a chosen people for a pottage of
161. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
162. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983) at 34
(current groundwater supplies municipal and industrial uses in Texas). Of course, there is always the
specter of federal intervention as a means of apportioning available water supplies-a possibility that
could result in a "loss of some or possibly all control by the states over the allocation and use of their
limited water resources." Clyde, supra note 96, at 558.
163. One such alternative is a more decentralized, self-sufficient, and "limited growth"
economy, which would presumably make fewer and less costly demands on our resource base. See E.
SCHUMACHER, SMALL is BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1973). Another possibil-
ity, coming from a completely different philosophical direction, is the prospect of "privatizing" more of
our publically owned or controlled resources (water included,) thereby "depoliticizing" resource use
and exchange and, again, tempering the course of resource depletion. See Hearings on Montana Water
Marketing Legislation, supra note 125 (Statement of Larry Dodge, former Libertarian Party U.S.
Senate candidate in Montana). The author makes no ringing endorsement of either alternative.
Nevertheless, the author is convinced that some critics of the existing socioeconomic order may be the
equivalent of "prophets in the wilderness," although their messages have more secular overtones. The
need for solutions to our current resource problems certainly should not lead us to reach for abstract,
ideological pipedreams. But we should be equally alert to the possibility that the current socioeconomic
wisdom also contains elements of undesirability-elements readily alterable by changes in certain
personal attitudes and institutional arrangements.
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lentils.16 4 Critical thinking and rational discourse are absolute necessities
in the water export debate. In their recent book on the socioeconomic
challenges facing the American West, Colorado Governor Richard Lamm
and journalist Michael McCarthy have fairly described the task ahead:
As takers converge on western water,. . .the West approaches
flashpoint. Looking to the future, it is left with one choice: with all
of the force it can muster, it must fight for its water. . . .If it does
[this], it may stave off doomsday. If not, just as it once sprang
from dust, so will the West return to it.L65
*ADDENDUM*
On April 21, 1983, the Montana Legislature passed a bill repealing
the current law banning water exports without legislative approval. The
same legislation includes criteria under which the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation could issue a permit for either an in-state or
out-of-state appropriation of more than 10,000 acre feet of water. The
criteria require consideration of (1) impacts on the state's water supply; (2)
economic benefits to the state; (3) feasibility of the project; (4) effects on
property rights; and (5) possible environmental impacts. Legislative
ratification of each water marketing proposal is also required by the bill.
The new legislation also calls for a two-year study of the impacts of
interstate water transfers. Nevertheless, the ban on use of water in coal
slurry pipelines is retained. The new legislation will terminate in two years,
at which time the legislature will presumably consider and adopt a more
carefully designed marketing policy."' 6
164. Genesis 25:29-34.
165. R. LAMM & M. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 206.
166. See H.B. 908,48th Leg., Regular Sess. (1983) (Conference Comm. version); Great Falls
Tribune, Apr. 21, 1983, at 1-B, col. 1 (discussion of water marketing legislation). As this comment was
going to print, it was unclear whether the permit issuance criteria of H.B. 908 were sufficiently tailored
to meet the dictates of the Sporhase decision.
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